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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamics of an industry that is subject to exclusive geographical li-
censing. I develop a model of license ownership that predicts the evolution of proﬁt-maximizing
entry and acquisition decisions by ﬁrms over time, starting from an initial allocation of licenses.
The entry and acquisition process is modeled as a one-sided coalition-formation game as in
Farrell and Scotchmer (1988), where acquisition payoﬀs depend on economies of scale and ag-
glomeration (economies of density). I estimate the model for the cable television industry in
Canada using a panel that I have constructed from 1990 to 1996. The dataset builds up from
the national regulator’s license-ownership decision ﬁles, and contains license-level information
on acquisition decisions, subscribership, and subscription proﬁts. The model is estimated in two
steps. I ﬁrst estimate ﬁrms’ license-level proﬁt functions, and then estimate the parameters of
the ﬁxed, merger and entry cost functions by Simulated Maximum Likelihood. Through coun-
terfactual simulations, I use the estimated model to quantify the extent to which economies of
scale and density drive acquisition behaviour, and to evaluate how merger activity reacts to a
partial deregulation that occurs in 1994. Counterfactual experiments are also used to evaluate
policies that stimulate entry or reduce acquisitions in the early years of the sample. The main
ﬁnding is that these policies can lead to more productive dominant ﬁrms in the long-run as the
industry consolidates.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L12, L22, L96, G34
Keywords: Acquisition, Entry, Coalition Formation, Economies of Density, Economies of Scale,
Simulated Maximum Likelihood, Cable Television
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In this paper, I develop and estimate a model of acquisitions and entry for an industry that is
subject to exclusive geographic licensing. I apply the model to the Canadian cable television
industry, and estimate its parameters using a panel containing information on ﬁrms’ acquisition
and entry decisions, geographic locations, and license-level proﬁts. I have constructed these data
using the individual acquisition and entry decision ﬁles of the national regulator for the industry
over the 1990-1996 period.1
This paper provides a unique, in-depth empirical analysis of the determinants of mergers. I
evaluate how economies of scale and density (i.e.: agglomeration) aﬀects ﬁrms’ acquisition incen-
tives, and how deregulation can trigger merger activity. The estimated model is also used to study
policies that stimulate entry behaviour, or reduce acquisitions in the early years of the industry’s
life-cycle. Given the industry is likely to consolidate over time because of scale eﬀects, the question
is to what extent policymakers can help ensure that the emerging dominant ﬁrms are productive,
and do not grow based on scale merit-alone. Although the results from these policy experiments
are speciﬁc to the cable television industry, they are informative for entry and merger policy for
industries where scale eﬀects are present, and dominant ﬁrms are likely to arise in the long-run.
The acquisition and entry model that the analysis is based on explicitly accounts for the in-
terdependency and mutual exclusivity of ﬁrms’ merger and entry decisions. There are three key
features of the industry and data that keeps the model tractable, and that allows me to identify
the impact that economies of scale, density and deregulation have on acquisition behaviour. Over
my entire sample period, ﬁrms are local monopolists within their licenses. This allows me to ab-
stract from modeling complications related to oligopolistic product-market competition, such as
business stealing incentives or market power motives for acquisition.2 Across the local monopolies,
my dataset contains information on ﬁrms’ proﬁts at the license-level. Therefore, I can estimate the
proﬁt function of cable companies directly, a luxury empirical studies of market structure typically
1I use the words acquisition, merger, and buyout interchangeably. This study focuses however on acquisitions,
where there is a selling ﬁrm that ceases to exist following a merger. That is, I do not study “mergers of equals.”
2Examples of entry/exit models with network competition that attempt to deal with these diﬃculties include the
seminal work of Seim (2006), and more recently by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009).
1do not have.3 This often restricts researchers’ ability to control for location and ﬁrm unobserved
heterogeneity in proﬁts, something that these data allow me to account for. Moreover, the proﬁt
data reveal a scale eﬀect on proﬁts: all else equal, large cable companies (in terms of national sub-
scribership) earn more proﬁts per-subscriber than small ones. This gives large ﬁrms an incentive
to acquire the licenses of small ﬁrms, as larger companies can earn higher proﬁts than the status
quo. Finally, I exploit the fact that a partial deregulation occurs within my sample period. Using
variation in ﬁrms’ channel oﬀerings and proﬁts before and after the policy change, I ﬁnd that large
cable companies take advantage of the policy by oﬀering new channels to its subscribers, while
smaller ﬁrms do not. My estimates show that this increases large ﬁrms’ proﬁtability advantage.
Using the model, I quantify the extent to which this change in the scale eﬀect is responsible for the
observed rise in acquisitions that follows the deregulation.
My acquisition and entry model is based on a cooperative, one-sided coalition formation game
as in Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). Starting from an initial allocation of licenses to ﬁrms, in each
period (year) cable companies make irreversible merger and entry decisions that aﬀects the license
allocation, and that determines the set of cable companies that play the acquisition game in the
next period. For a given allocation of licenses within a year, ﬁrms earn proﬁts from their set of
licenses. The amount of surplus generated by a merger depends on three main factors: (1) the
relative size of the buying and selling ﬁrms (which aﬀects relative proﬁtability through a scale
eﬀect), (2) an agglomeration eﬀect, as merging ﬁrms can reduce their overall ﬁxed costs per license
(related to local administrative and technical expenses) if they own licenses that are geographically
proximate, and (3) ﬁrm heterogeneity, which captures diﬀerences in unobservables that aﬀect proﬁts
(such as managerial ability or ﬁrm productivity). The equilibrium of the game is characterized by
a stability condition, where for a given set of merger and entry arrangements, no collection of ﬁrms
can proﬁtability deviate from their arrangements.
The model is estimated in two steps. First, I estimate a per-subscriber variable proﬁt function
using within-license variation in subscription proﬁts, ﬁrm size, and local demographics, while con-
3In the absence of proﬁt data, authors infer the parameters of proﬁt functions in entry/exit studies by rationalizing
the observed entry/exit decisions of ﬁrms in the data. This revealed preference approach to proﬁt function estimation
dates back to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). Jia (2008) is a recent example that takes such an approach.
2trolling for ﬁrm and license unobserved heterogeneity. To account for the impact that the 1994
policy change has on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, I estimate diﬀerent variable proﬁt functions for the pre (1990-
1994) and post (1995-1996) regulatory periods. In the second step, the parameters of the ﬁxed,
merger, and entry cost functions are estimated using data on ﬁrms’ acquisition and entry deci-
sions, their geographic locations, and predictions for the additional variable proﬁts generated by
mergers, that are computed using the estimated proﬁt function. The second-step parameters are
estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood, where the likelihood for the model is constructed
using inequalities implied by the equilibrium conditions of the acquisition and entry game.
The estimation results provide various empirical ﬁndings on the determinants of acquisitions.
As noted, large cable companies earn more proﬁts per-subscriber than do small ones, and that these
diﬀerentials are magniﬁed by the 1994 policy change. My counterfactual experiments show that
these ﬁrm size eﬀects are the main driver of acquisition behaviour in the industry. When I remove
the scale eﬀect on proﬁts and simulate data using the model, acquisition levels fall dramatically.
The model also predicts that the deregulation is largely responsible for the spike in acquisition
behaviour that follows the policy change. In the absence of the impact that deregulation has on
ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions, my simulations show that acquisitions do not spike in 1995 as they do in
the data. Economies of density are found to have a modest eﬀect on ﬁrms’ acquisition incentives.
Given the geographic clustering of ﬁrms’ license ownership in the data, this result is somewhat
surprising. It highlights the importance of accounting for scale eﬀects when estimating the impact
that economies of density have on ﬁrms’ acquisition incentives.
Using the estimated model, I also conduct two sets of policy experiments that study entry subsi-
dies, and policies that restrict merger activity (for example, through regulator-imposed acquisition
fees) in the industry’s infancy. I ﬁnd that both of these policies can yield more productive dominant
ﬁrms in the long-run as the industry consolidates. Entry subsidies make it easier for productive
entrants to enter and acquire relatively unproductive incumbents. Acquisition fees reduce merger
activity in the early years of the industry’s life-cycle, helping prevent large cable companies from
forming. If large companies emerge early on, they develop scale advantages that allow them to
continue to grow by acquiring smaller cable operators. However, since entrants typically enter the
3industry by acquiring small cable companies (as acquisition costs scale with incumbent size), scale-
driven acquisitions by initially large incumbents can prevent the entry of productive entrants who
would otherwise acquire relatively unproductive incumbents. That is, large incumbent scale-eﬀects
can overwhelm any productivity diﬀerences between incumbents and new entrants if incumbents
grow too fast. By slowing the initial rate of consolidation, merger policy can help ensure that pro-
ductive entrants can enter the industry. By creating a rich pool of initial entrants, these policies can
ensure that dominant ﬁrms emerge in the long-run due to their intrinsic productivity advantages
as well as scale eﬀects, and not because of scale eﬀects alone.
This paper relates to a large empirical literature on merger waves, which consists of descriptive,
aggregate industry-level studies. Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) provide a comprehensive
overview of this literature. They emphasize that industrial shocks, such as deregulation and tech-
nological change, are fundamental to the merger waves experienced by various industries in the U.S.
during the 1980’s and 1990’s. I provide a microeconometric analysis of a merger wave that follows
a well-identiﬁed regulatory change within an industry. Further, I identify a mechanism through a
merger wave occurs by estimating an equilibrium model ﬁrms’ acquisition and entry decisions.
I also contribute to an empirical literature on market structure and agglomeration. Jia (2008),
Holmes (2008) and Ellickson et. al (2008) all study the impact that economies of density have on
the spread of Walmart and other retail chains in the U.S.. Aguirregabiria and Vincentini (2006)
develop methods for estimating dynamic, spatial, multi-store entry models that focus on economies
of density and ﬁrms’ pre-emption incentives. Akkus and Horta¸ csu (2007) use maximum score
methods to study bank mergers in a spatial environment, and ﬁnd that ﬁrms of similar size and in
geographic proximity are more likely to merge. My ﬁndings provide new empirical insights on how
market structure can be shaped by buyouts, and how dominant ﬁrms can emerge through their
acquisition of smaller companies over time, in industries where economies of scale are present.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I provide an overview of the Canadian
cable television industry. The data and empirical facts are highlighted in Section 3. I develop a
model of acquisitions and entry in Section 4, and outline my estimation strategy in Section 5. My
empirical ﬁndings and counterfactual analyses are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
42 Cable Television in Canada
Since 1986, cable companies in Canada have been regulated at the national level by the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), according to the Cable Television Regulations
(the Regulations), which were enacted in subsection 16(1) of the Broadcasting Act. Prior to 2001, a
primary feature of the Regulations is the issuance of geographical licenses from the CRTC to cable
operators, that gives companies exclusive rights to be the sole cable provider within pre-deﬁned
Local Service Areas (LSAs). LSAs are deﬁned by the CRTC, and typically correspond to cities,
towns, municipalities or villages. Prior to the entry of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) in 1998,
exclusive licenses gives local cable companies monopoly rights over the provision of cable services
within their LSAs. Licenses do not involve fees of any sort, are deﬁned over 3-5 year time horizons
(at the end of which they are renewable), and can be revoked by the CRTC at any time.
Cable companies extract rents from subscribers within their LSAs by oﬀering tiered cable bun-
dles in the form of basic, extended basic, and specialty cable packages. The latter two tiers consti-
tute ‘non-basic’ or ‘discretionary’ service, both of which involve a tying requirement: subscribers
must sign up for basic cable before purchasing any packages from the non-basic tier. The price and
channel composition of the bundles are aﬀected by the Regulations, as the CRTC imposes basic
price regulation, and channel carriage restrictions nationwide. Basic price regulation puts an upper
bound on the allowable increase in basic prices from year to year.4 Carriage restrictions involve
three primary components. First, they contain “must carry” provisions that force cable companies
to carry all local over-the-air channels in their basic packages. Second, the CRTC regulates the uni-
verse of channels that may be oﬀered by cable companies. It does so by oﬀering licenses to channel
providers that allow them to transmit their signals to Canadian cable companies. Finally, Canadian
content provisions require that cable companies show a ﬁxed proportion of hours of Canadian-based
programming.5 Up until 1999, cable companies’ primary source of proﬁts comes from their cable
4The upper bound on basic price growth is determined by the inﬂation rate, capital cost allowances, and whether
cable companies are in ﬁnancial distress. LSAs with less than 2000 subscribers are not subject to basic price regulations
so as to give cable companies an additional incentive to operate in smaller, rural areas.
5As of 2009, content rules require at least 60% of all programming between 6:00am and midnight be “Canadian
content”, and at least 50% of programming between 6:00pm and midnight be “Canadian content”, where “Canadian
content” is deﬁned by the CRTC.
5oﬀerings. In 1999, Eastlink becomes the ﬁrst cable company in Canada to oﬀer telephone service,
which signals the beginning of an era where cable companies bundle cable, phone, and internet
services.6
Firm size, in terms of national subscribership, plays an important role in determining the pricing
and channel bundling decisions of cable companies, that in turn determines the proﬁtability of a
cable operator for a given LSA. Various empirical studies of the U.S. cable television industry
document the fact that large ﬁrms tend to realize lower per-subscriber costs for their channel
oﬀerings as a result of vertical integration with channel companies, or higher bargaining power
that lowers large ﬁrms’ negotiated per-subscriber channel cost.7 Lower per-subscriber costs allow
large companies to realize higher proﬁts for a given cable package oﬀering. Moreover, these cost
diﬀerentials can aﬀect ﬁrms’ pricing and channel bundling decisions, which can further impact the
relative proﬁts that a large from can earn from a given LSA relative to that of a small ﬁrm.
These proﬁt diﬀerentials give rise to acquisition behaviour in the cable industry, where large
ﬁrms purchase small ﬁrms in order to gain access to new subscribers, and earn additional proﬁts
beyond the status quo.8 In Canada, the CRTC recognizes this fact and formally deﬁnes its national
policy with respect to acquisitions in Public Notice PB89-109. The CRTC decentralizes the buyout
process, by allowing collections of cable operators to propose deals to the national regulator. These
exchanges are not competitive (i.e. there is no bidding for licenses), and the CRTC is explicit in
that it does not look for rival purchasers. The regulator evaluates transactions on a case-by-case
basis, and puts the onus on the parties involved to show that a proposed merger “yields signiﬁcant
and unequivocal beneﬁts to the communities served.” The chief concern of the CRTC is that
the basic cable rates do not rise following an acquisition. Firms are free to do as they wish in
altering non-basic package prices and content. The predominant beneﬁt put forth by purchasing
companies is the fact that they can oﬀer better cable service than the status quo without raising
basic prices. Another often cited motive is local geographic scale economies (i.e. economies of
6See http://www.eastlink.ca/about/history/index.asp
7Chipty (1995), Ford and Jackson, (1997), Chipty and Snyder (1999), and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009) all ﬁnd
evidence to support the fact that large cable companies are relatively more proﬁtable than small ones.
8Various articles in media journals document consolidation for the U.S. cable industry. See Parsons (2003) for a
historical overview.
6density/agglomeration) can be realized from buyouts if the acquiring ﬁrm operates in LSAs that
are geographically proximate to those of the selling cable companies. I provide examples of CRTC-
documented decisions that involve improved channel oﬀerings and economies of density in Figures 12
and 13 in the Appendix. In both examples, the buying company is increasing the number of channels
oﬀered locally. Figure 12 shows the buying company, Rogers, sinks $380,000 in acquisition-related
investments into technical services and capital costs. These sunk acquisition costs are common to
many acquisitions.
1994 Deregulatory Policy
With Public Notice PB94-59 the CRTC alters its channel carriage restrictions by expanding the
universe of non-basic channels that can be oﬀered by cable companies. The regulator licenses 10
new channels, consisting of 2 English pay channels, 6 English speciality channels, and 2 French pay
channels.9 All of the new services are Canadian-based products, and their introduction represents
the ﬁrst major change in the universe of channel oﬀerings since the late 1980’s. The pay channels
are oﬀered as separate ` a la carte services by cable operators, while the specialty channels are
primarily intended for the extended-basic tier. The policy change is a response by the CRTC to
the emergence of DBS in the U.S. in 1994, which signals a (forthcoming) changing of the times for
the cable television industry in Canada. The CRTC’s primary objective is to ensure that there is
additional Canadian presence in subscribers’ non-basic channel packages, as the entry of DBS in
Canada will at some point ﬂood consumers’ non-basic options with an array of internationally-based
channels. None of these new services are vertically integrated with cable companies, implying that
all cable operators face separate new channel adoption decisions.
3 Data
The data provides context and motivation for my modeling choices. I therefore discuss empirics
before developing a model of acquisitions and entry for the cable television industry.
9These channels include 2 English pay channels (Movie Max and Classic Channel), 6 English specialty channels
(YOU: Your Channel, Showcase, Bravo!, Lifestyle Television, Discovery, and The Country Network), and 2 French
specialty channels (Le R´ eseau de l’information and Arts et Divertissement.)
73.1 Sources
The primary dataset is constructed using the CRTC Master Files for the 1990-1996 period.10 They
contain detailed information on ﬁrms’ revenues, costs, and subscribership at the (LSA, year)-level
of aggregation, and are broken down by basic and non-basic services. The information contained
in these ﬁles is collected and veriﬁed by Statistics Canada on behalf of the CRTC through ﬁrms’
submission of Annual Return of “Broadcasting Distribution Licensee” forms. I use a subset of the
variables available including the number of subscribers, subscription revenue, channel counts, and
aﬃliation payments made by cable companies to channel providers. I restrict my empirical analysis
to 1990-1996, as information on non-basic subscriptions and revenues is not available prior to 1990.
Furthermore, restricting my analysis to a period before 1998 allows me to abstract from modeling
complications related to competition from DBS (below). I can also focus solely on proﬁtability from
cable services as ﬁrms do not bundle phone, internet and cable over this period. After removing
these observations and dropping outliers, the resulting unbalanced panel from the Master Files
consists of 4407 observations, over the 1990-1996 period, across 826 locations (out of 1262 total).
The second data source is the CRTC’s Decision and Notices (DNO) archives. For each LSA,
the CRTC maintains searchable archives online for all LSA-ownership related decisions from 1984
onwards.11 Example decision ﬁles include new license applications, license renewals and revocations,
as well as license buyouts among cable companies. Using these decision ﬁles, I track the current
cable operator (if there is one) for all 1262 LSAs deﬁned in the Master Files over the 1985-2004
period. For each acquisition, I record the acquisition date, the identity of the buying and selling
ﬁrms, the LSAs involved, and the transaction price (where available). I also identify new entrant
cable companies in the sample. Although the Master Files contain information on how licenses are
allocated across ﬁrms in a given year, it is important for my empirical results that the exact timing of
acquisition and entry decisions, as well as the ﬁrms and locations involved, be accurately recorded.
Further, the information contained in the Decision and Notice ﬁles identiﬁes the subsidiaries of
large cable companies that diﬀer by name from their parent company. The Master Files often fail
to distinguish subsidiaries from their parent companies. Figures 12 and 13, referred to above, are
10Stephen Law provided these data. They have been previously used in Law (1999) and subsequent papers.
11The url for the Decisions and Notice archives is http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/dno.htm
8examples of Decision Files for acquisitions.
I also collect information from the 1991 and 1996 Canadian Censuses on the total number of
households, average household income, average household size, average age, the unemployment
rate, educational attainment (fraction of population with post-secondary education), and urban
density (population per square kilometre). These data are used to control for variation in LSA-
level demand for cable below. LSA name identiﬁers are matched to their corresponding Census
Subdivision or Dissemination Area to obtain the above Census aggregates at the LSA level. I use
the 1996 Geosuite package from Statistics Canada to track location-speciﬁc household counts and
urban density, as it provides a more accurate measure of the local population and urban density
than what a location’s Census Subsidivision yields. Moreover, Geosuite provides data for 1991
household counts and urban density, correcting for diﬀerences in Census boundaries between the
1991 and 1996 Censuses. For non-Census years, I follow Holmes (2008) and use a weighted average











x1996, and I set x1990 = x1991. Geographic information on
LSA latitudes and longitudes are obtained using location name searches from Google Maps.12
For my empirical analysis, I require a measure of a ﬁrm’s national subscribership in a given
year. This is simply the total number of subscribers across all LSAs that a cable company currently
operates in. The total number of subscribers is relatively well-reported, as I have information on
these ﬁgures for all 1262 LSAs in the Master Files. Using these data, and Census information on
the total number of households in a given location, I interpolate missing years’ subscribership data.
This provides an estimate of market size for all locations over the 1990-1996 period, which allows
me to compute a ﬁrm’s national subscribership for every year.
3.2 Empirical Facts
Table 1 reports summary statistics at the LSA-level for the CRTC Master File data (top panel),
and the matched Census data (bottom panel), for the 1990-1996 period. The table shows the
12I obtain the centre of a location by doing a name search for an LSA, and then use the script
javascript:void(prompt(’’,gApplication.getMap().getCenter())). Ideally, I would use geo-coded
maps containing LSA boundaries to track the ‘location’ of LSAs in the sample, however in my discussions with
the CRTC, it has become evident that no such maps exist.
9Table 1: Local Service Area Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CRTC Master Files
Subscription Revenue 24.852 68.632 0.004 855.238
Aﬃliation Payments 3.045 9.722 0 157.162
Subscriber Count 9.730 26.755 0.010 297.268
Variable Proﬁt per Subscriber 1.741 1.572 0.012 15.863
Census
Average Household Income 39.232 9.350 6.251 88.098
Average Age of Population 46.203 4.059 29.560 59.766
Urband Density 4.481 6.950 0.010 67.291
Unemployment Rate 0.130 0.087 0.009 0.713
Share of Population with 0.306 0.078 0.019 0.723
Post-Secondary Schooling
Notes: The number of observations is N = 4407. Subscription revenue and aﬃliation payments to
channel providers for all cable services are reported in terms of one hundred thousand dollars per year.
Subscriber count measured in thousands and variable proﬁt per-subscriber is reported in hundreds of
dollars per-subscriber per year. Urban density is measured in terms of one hunderd people per square
kilometre. All nominal dollar amounts are adjusted to 1992 constant dollars using the seasonally-
adjusted Canadian CPI, excluding indirect taxes, food and energy (Table 176-003, Statistics Canada).
number of subscribers across LSAs varies extensively. For example, the subscribership of the
smallest LSA is less than one percent of the size of the largest LSA. The average sized LSA has
9730 subscribers, while the median (unreported) has 1505 subscribers, reﬂecting skewness in the
subscribership distribution. Subscription revenue and aﬃliation payments to channel providers
similarly vary extensively across markets. Variable proﬁt per-subscriber (subscription revenue less
upstream channel aﬃliation payments) on average is $174 per year, or $14.50 per month.13 Per-
subscriber proﬁts also has substantial variation across LSAs, and over time, reﬂecting both variation
in both LSA-level demographics, and diﬀerences in cable package oﬀerings by ﬁrms.
Figure 1 shows how LSA ownership concentration amongst cable companies evolves over the
1985-2004 period for 4 geographic regions in Canada.14 The ﬁgure plots, by region, the share of
LSAs owned by the 4 largest cable operators.15 The regional plots depict a non-stationary trend
in LSA ownership concentration. The increase across the regions is notable, with the largest rise
13All nominal amounts are in 1992 dollars throughout the paper.
14Atlantic Canada includes Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick. Western
Canada includes Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.
15Similar patterns are obtained if I compute these ﬁgures by subscribership rather than LSA counts.
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Satellite Enters Bundling Starts
occurring in Atlantic Canada (rise from 20% to 80%), while Quebec realizes the smallest, yet
considerable, LSA-ownership concentration growth (rise from 15% to 60%). Table 2 highlights the
identity of the top 10 ﬁrms in terms of national subscribership in 1996, and their involvement in
acquisitions. Out of the 674 cable companies that are active at some point over the 1985-2004
period, the top 10 ﬁrms account for over half of the 514 ﬁrm-level buyouts, and 70% of the 1428
LSA acquisitions. Generally speaking, these data reﬂect the emergence of dominant regional cable
companies, and geographic clustering of LSA ownership over time.
Firm acquisition behaviour is fundamental to the rise in concentration of LSA ownership. Fig-
ures 2 and 3 illustrate how annual merger activity varies over the 1990-1997 period. Figure 2 shows
the total number of LSA acquisitions by incumbents, and Figure 3 graphs the corresponding ﬁrm-
level acquisitions. There are two clear spikes in acquisition activity in 1990 and 1995. The ﬁrst
does not correspond to a particular event, rather it is part of an initial sorting of ﬁrms to LSAs that
follows the inception of the Regulations. The 1995 spike corresponds to the deregulatory policy,
which is enacted in June of 1994, that expands the number of non-basic channels available to cable
companies.
I investigate ﬁrms’ relative proﬁtability, and their response to the 1994 regulatory change with
Figures 4-7. These ﬁgures plot the mean number of non-basic channels, revenue per-subscriber,
aﬃliation payments per-subscriber and subscription proﬁts across LSAs, and are broken down by
11Table 2: Acquisitions by Large Companies
Firm Acq. LSA Acq. Share of Primary
Buyer Count Count Subscribers Regions
Rogers 16 105 0.321 Ontario
Shaw 57 227 0.182 West
Videotron 26 87 0.143 Quebec
Cogeco 52 145 0.059 Quebec, Ontario
C.F. Cable 6 39 0.052 Quebec
Fundy 8 24 0.025 Atlantic
Persona 81 267 0.025 Atlantic, Ontario, West
Videon 8 54 0.019 West
Eastlink 19 58 0.017 Atlantic
Cable Atlantic 4 12 0.014 Atlantic
Top 10 Total 277 1018 0.852
All Other Companies 240 413 0.148
Total 514 1428 1
Notes: Subscribership counts/shares are computed for 1996.
whether LSAs are operated by one of the 10 largest companies (by national subscribership in
1996) in a given year.16 I refer to the top 10 ﬁrms as “large” ﬁrms, and all other ﬁrms outside
of the top 10 as “small” ﬁrms. Figure 4 shows that large ﬁrms oﬀer more non-basic channels on
average than small ﬁrms, and that the 1994 policy change has an asymmetric impact on large
and small ﬁrms’ non-basic channel oﬀerings. The average number of non-basic channels between
1994 and 1995 jumps (approximately) from 11 to 15 channels for large ﬁrms, while there is little
movement in the average number of non-basic channels oﬀered by small ﬁrms. Figures 5 and 6
highlight a drastic jump in per-subscriber revenue and channel costs for large companies, that goes
unrealized by smaller operators from 1994 to 1995. These trends reﬂect the relative diﬀerence
in non-basic channel adoption between large and small companies observed in Figure 4. Large
companies pay more for additional channels, and pass these costs down to subscribers. Subscription
revenue also rises if consumers switch from basic to non-basic cable as a result of the new non-basic
channel oﬀerings. Figure 7 shows that the revenue growth dominates the cost growth for large
companies, leading to an asymmetric rise in average per-subscriber proﬁtability between large and
small companies following 1994. Between 1994 and 1996, the top 10 cable companies’ average
16Similar ﬁgures are produced if I break down ﬁrms by the top 5 through top 30 largest companies.










































































annual per-subscriber subscription proﬁt rises from $99.79 to $175.35, while such a rise is not
realized by small cable operators’ proﬁts. Figure 7 also shows that prior 1994, small ﬁrms earn
more proﬁts per-subscriber than do large ﬁrms. These unconditional means do not control for the
fact that large cable companies tend to be located in more urban centres, where subscribers have
more alternatives to watching television relative to consumers in rural LSAs. This highlights the
importance of controlling for LSA-speciﬁc observables and unobservables in estimating the impact
that ﬁrm size has on proﬁtability below.
4 Model
I develop a model for the cable television industry to evaluate the impact that subscribership-based
scale economies, economies of density, and the 1994 regulatory change has on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability,
acquisition, and entry decisions over the 1990-1996 period. The industry consists of i = 1,...,Nt
cable companies, who are local monopolists across ℓ = 1,...,L LSAs (locations), for t = 0...T
periods (years). I slightly abuse notation, and use Nt and L to represent the set of ﬁrms and
locations as well.
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Within each period, cable companies myopically play a two subperiod merger game. In the ﬁrst
subperiod, ﬁrms interact in the acquisition and entry market, where incumbents simultaneously
decide whether to merge, and entrants make entry decisions.17 I model this process as a coalition-
formation game as in Farrell and Scotchmer (1988).18 Acquisitions are irreversible, which means
17I abstract from geographic expansions into new LSAs as there is insuﬃcient new LSA entry activity over 1990-
1996 to admit empirical modeling of this behaviour. I simply drop the LSAs that are expanded into by incumbents
or entrants after 1989 in the estimation sample. Since these LSAs are located in rural, sparsely populated areas, they
should have little impact on the measurement of economies of density and national subscribership.
18Recent research in the empirical political economy literature uses one-sided matching models in a spatial setting.
Weese (2009) uses a one-sided coalition-formation framework to study political amalgamations in Japan. Gordon
and Knight (2009) use a one-sided matching model to study school-district amalgamations. Both papers restrict
their analyses to contiguous mergers, as non-contiguous amalgamations are not observed. The latter paper further
abstracts from matches involving more than two districts as they rarely occur. I cannot make such abstractions since
14selling ﬁrms cease to exist following a merger. Thus, the outcome of the merger game for a given
period determines the set of ﬁrms that exist in the next period, implying that Nt evolves over time.





1...N0 if t = 0
{i : ﬁrm i still active in year t} if t > 0
Within a period, the set of LSAs ﬁrm i operates in potentially changes depending on whether it
acquires other cable companies in the ﬁrst subperiod. I denote Lit and ˜ Lit as the set of LSAs owned
by ﬁrm i within the ﬁrst and second subperiods of period t, respectively. Given the outcomes from
the acquisition game, ﬁrms earn proﬁts from their LSAs in the second subperiod. In describing the
model, I begin with the second subperiod as it is fundamental to the payoﬀs that govern play in
the ﬁrst subperiod.
The myopic decision-making assumption is strong, and warrants some discussion. If I allow
ﬁrms to be forward-looking in their acquisition decisions, then I must compute the ﬂow value of a
match which takes into account all possible merger sequences for all ﬁrms in the future. As has been
noted by previous authors who estimate strategic models of network formation, the computational
burden of such a calculation is extreme, and one is forced to make assumptions to make the model
tractable. The myopic decision assumption allows ﬁrms in my model to consider the rich choice
set of all potential merger partners in the data, and further allows ﬁrms to consider the joint value
of acquisitions of two or more ﬁrms, which previous papers abstract from.19 Another modeling
approach is to incorporate fully forward-looking decision making, but completely ignore strategic
interaction by ﬁrms. This is the approach Holmes (2008) takes in studying the spread of Walmart
in the U.S.. This is not an attractive alternative in my context as the Decision and Notice ﬁles
clearly show that ﬁrms strategically interact when engaging in a merger. A second motive for this
assumption is the fact that a collection of dominant ﬁrms grow in a highly non-stationary fashion
I often observe many non-contiguous acquisitions, as well as mergers involving 3 or 4 ﬁrms.
19That is, I do not have to make a local managers assumption (as in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009)) whereby
the collection of merger decisions are made independently when rms merge with multiple partners. There is ample
evidence in the CRTC Decision and Notice ﬁles to suggest that ﬁrms account for the joint value of mergers with
multiple partners when making acquisition decisions.
15over time. Modeling the forward-looking behaviour of these ﬁrms would thus require that I develop
and estimate a non-stationary game, an environment which to date lacks empirical methods.20
Developing such methods is well beyond the scope of this paper.
4.1 Sub-Period 2: LSA Proﬁts
Firms oﬀer cable packages to subscribers within their LSAs, subject to the basic price and carriage
restrictions imposed by the CRTC, which deﬁnes how much subscription proﬁts per-subscriber a
company earns from a given LSA.21 As discussd, the composition, cost, and proﬁtability of these
bundles can vary depending on the national presence of a cable operator. Companies also incur
ﬁxed technical, administrative and service costs in oﬀering services to their LSAs. The following
proﬁt function accounts for these factors, predicting ﬁrm i’s proﬁt from LSA ℓ at time t:
πiℓt = viℓt × Qℓt − Fiℓt (1)
where viℓt is the subscription proﬁts per-subscriber, Qℓt is the population of subscribers in location
ℓ at time t, and Fiℓt is ﬁrm i’s ﬁxed cost of servicing LSA ℓ at time t. In Equation (1), I take the
total subscribership of the market as exogeneously given.22 Out of the total number of households
in a given LSA, one might expect the number of households that sign up for cable (known as
the penetration rate) to depend on the cable company who serves LSA ℓ at time t. However, in
my preliminary empirical work I found virtually no relationship between the penetration rate and
20Current methods for estimating dynamic network-formation games using entry/exit models (such as those used
by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) and others) require that entry/exit behaviour follow a stationary process. Ellickson
et. al (2008) highlight this non-stationarity issue as well in motivating their use of a static game in estimating a
strategic model of network formation in the U.S. retail industry.
21A complete industry model, like that of Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009), incorporates these optimal price and
bundling decisions of cable companies. However, since data on channels’ identity and prices for extended basic and
specialty services are currently unavailable, I cannot explicity model how ﬁrms extract rents from their subscribers.
See Chu (2008) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009) for structural approaches to modeling cable companies’ bundling
decisions in the U.S., where channel identities and bundle prices are available from the Cable Television Factbook.
Microdata on channel oﬀerings, market shares, and prices for extended basic and speciality services are availabe in
Canada from a private marketing company called Mediastats for a price that is in excess of $10,000 per year.
22The tying requirement for non-basic and basic services implies that the total number of people signed up for
basic services equals the total number of subscribers overall. To see why, suppose individuals’ tastes for cable is
heterogeneous such that people with strong preferences for cable get non-basic services, and low demand types get
basic cable only (as in Chu (2008) or Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009)). With heterogenous tastes for cable, assuming
the fraction of people that sign up for cable service in a population is exogenous is the same as saying the marginal
consumer at the lower end of the cable willingness-to-pay-distribution is exogenous.
16ﬁrm characteristics after controlling for local demographics.23 I therefore adopt a parsimonious
speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function that assumes the subscriber base is exogenous.















+ β4i + β5ℓ + β6t + ǫiℓt (2)
where ˜ Qit =
 
ℓ∈˜ Lit Qℓt is the national subscribership of ﬁrm i in the second subperiod of time
t, and Xℓt are location-specifc proﬁt shifters (for example, income). The dependent variable is
calculated as total annual subscription revenue from basic and non-basic services, less aﬃliation
payments made to upstream channel providers, divided by the total number of basic subscribers
(which is equivalent to the total number of subscribers because of the tying of non-basic to basic
services). The error term consists of four components: β4i is ﬁrm i’s individual eﬀect, β5ℓ is location
ℓ’s individual eﬀect, β6t is an aggregate time eﬀect, and ǫiℓt is an i.i.d idiosyncratic proﬁt shock
drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance Σǫ. I include the square of national
subscribership to allow for an increasing or decreasing eﬀect of ﬁrm size on per-subscriber proﬁtabil-
ity. The superscripts for the ﬁrst 4 coeﬃcients allows ﬁrms’ subscription proﬁt function to change
as a result of the 1994 deregulation. The values dreg = 0 and dreg = 1 respectively correspond to





2 for dreg ∈ {0,1}. They determine how ﬁrm size aﬀects LSA proﬁtability, and
the extent to which the policy change aﬀects the marginal eﬀect of ﬁrm size on subscription proﬁts.
Cable companies incur ﬁxed administrative, technical, capital, and marketing expenditures to
serve LSAs. As noted in many CRTC Decision Files, these costs can be spread across geographically
proximate LSAs. I therefore adopt the following speciﬁcation for the ﬁxed cost ﬁrm i pays to serve
23Speciﬁcally, I estimate a tobit model, with LSA random-eﬀects, that predicts the penetration rate as a function
of the exogenous demand shifters used in this paper, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects for the 15 largest ﬁrms, and the national
subscribership of a cable operator i in LSA ℓ at time t. The estimated marginal eﬀect (evaluated at sample means)
that a 100,000 subscriber increase in national subscribership has on the penetration rate is less that 0.1%. Firm ﬁxed
eﬀects also have negligible marginal eﬀects as well. Part of the reason for this may be due to the fact that basic cable
prices and channel oﬀerings are highly regulated (unlike non-basic services), implying that for a given LSA, ﬁrms’
ﬂexibility over what channels and prices to oﬀer in the basic package is limited. I have estimated the model in this
paper treating Qit as endogenous, and ﬁnd the results are largely unchanged.
17LSA ℓ at time t:
Fiℓt = fc0 + fc1Wℓt + fc2EODiℓt + fc3i + fc4ℓ + fc5t + ωiℓt (3)
where Wℓt are local cost shifters, EODiℓt is the economies of density realized by ﬁrm i in location ℓ
at time t, (fc3i,fc4ℓ,fc5t) are respectively ﬁrm, location and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost eﬀects, and ωiℓt
is an i.i.d idiosyncratic ﬁxed cost shock drawn from a mean-zero distribution. Economies of density
depends on how densely clustered ﬁrm i’s LSAs are located around LSA ℓ. I adopt a measure that






2dℓℓ′ where dℓℓ′ is the distance
from the centers of LSAs ℓ and ℓ′. To ensure consistency in estimation, the geographic eﬀect of
local LSA ownership on ﬁxed costs must die away at a suﬃcient rate as the distance between two
LSAs increases. I therefore set dℓℓ′ = ∞ for dℓℓ′ > ¯ D = 100 kilometres.24
4.2 Sub-Period 1: Acquisition Game
In the ﬁrst subperiod of period t, the acquisition and entry game is played by the set of Nt active
cable companies. It is a simultaneous-move, full information, co-operative game, where ﬁrms are
free to merge with other collections of ﬁrms.25 A merger at time t, St, consists of a subset of active
ﬁrms: St ⊂ Nt. A merger structure Πt is a partition of Nt into K mergers: Πt = {S1 ...SK},
Si
 
Sj = ∅ for i  = j.
For a given merger, I index the acquiring cable company with i. It is deﬁned as the largest
cable company by national subscribership in the ﬁrst subperiod: i = {i : i ∈ St,Qit = maxi∈St Qit},
where Qit =
 
ℓ∈Lit Qℓt is the national subscribership of ﬁrm i in the ﬁrst subperiod of period t.
This assumption is consistent with the fact that the largest ﬁrm is the buyer in over 95% of all
mergers. Buyer i acquires the remaining NSt − 1 ﬁrms, and their corresponding LSAs. The set of
LSAs owned by all of the ﬁrms in merger St as LSt =
 
i∈St Lit, and the total number of subscribers
across these LSAs is QSt =
 
ℓ∈LSt Qℓt.
The deﬁnition of the buyer matters for two reasons. First, the sellers’ ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects in the
24I have checked my estimation results for ¯ D = 75 and ¯ D = 150 kilometres, and ﬁnd little diﬀerence in my estimates.
25Note that the game is played at the ﬁrm level, not the LSA-level. I abstract from the possibility that ﬁrms sell
subsets of their LSAs to other ﬁrms, an event that I rarely observe in the data.
18per-subscriber proﬁts functions are replaced by the individual eﬀect of the buyer, which aﬀects the
surplus generated by an acquisition. Second, in forward-simulating merger activity for the industry
below, I must track the buyers year-to-year as the outcome of the acquisition game in period t
determines the allocation of LSAs to ﬁrms as well as the set of remaining cable companies at the
beginning of period t + 1.
Acquisition Payoﬀs and Costs






where the expectation operator is over ǫiℓt and ωiℓt, which I assume are drawn after the acquisition
and entry game is played. For merger St, the total value is similarly deﬁned as the sum of the value





Acquisitions are costly, as they typically involve large sunk investments by buying companies
related to technical upgrades of newly purchased cable systems, or initial marketing expenses and
distribution costs to promote new cable oﬀerings to subscribers. As discussed in Section 2 and
highlighted in Figure 12, these sunk expenditures are often in the range of hundreds of thousands
of dollars. I deﬁne acquisitions costs as follows:
ACSt = ac0 + ac1QSt\i (6)
where QSt\i = QSt − Qit is the total number of subscribers in the LSAs of the ﬁrms acquired by
buyer i. Acquisition costs will also capture any regulatory costs that are involved with mergers.
19Entry
In the data, I observe new cable companies who enter the industry by acquiring the LSAs of
incumbent ﬁrms. To account for entry in period t, I assume that there is one entrant for each
incumbent. Each entrant can only enter the industry through a bilateral acquisition, where it
acquires its corresponding incumbent cable company. The number (and set) of ﬁrms in the period t
acquisition game is thus Nt = 2 ˜ Nt, where ˜ Nt is the number of incumbent ﬁrms. This entry process
is largely consistent with my readings of the CRTC Decision and Notice Files. In the estimation
sample, there are no instances where an entrant acquires two or more incumbents, and entrants
typically acquire small incumbent cable companies.
Prior to entry, an entrant draws an individual variable proﬁt shock β4i, and must sink a one-time
entry cost ECSt deﬁned as:
ECSt = ec0 + ec1Qit (7)
Entry costs are higher for entrants who acquire incumbents with larger national subscribership. This
captures initial marketing and set-up expenses that scale with the size of a purchased incumbent
cable company. These costs also capture any regulatory costs, or one-time technical upgrade
expenditures that entrants sink upon acquiring an incumbent. I normalize entrants’ reservation
value to not entering to zero.
Acquisition Surplus
The surplus generated by merger St is the diﬀerence between what ﬁrms earn from their LSAs
jointly less the sum of what they earn apart, net acquisition or entry costs (depending on whether
the acquiring company is an entrant or incumbent):




t − (1 − 1{newit})ACSt − 1{newit}ECSt + εSt (8)
The indicator function 1{newit} equals 1 if the buying ﬁrm is an entrant. The ﬁnal term εSt is
an i.i.d merger-speciﬁc shock drawn from a mean-0 Type-1 Extreme Value distribution with scale
parameter σε. The shock captures any acquisition synergies that are observed by the ﬁrms but not
20the econometrician. Beyond this shock, acquisition surplus depends on the relative size of buyers
and sellers (which aﬀects variable proﬁts), economies of density if buyers and sellers own nearby
LSAs (which aﬀects total ﬁxed costs paid across LSAs), and diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable
proﬁt or ﬁxed cost eﬀects (i.e.: β4i and fc3i). Location and time-speciﬁc eﬀects in ﬁxed costs and
variable proﬁts (β5ℓ,β6t,fc4ℓ,fc5t) diﬀerence out in Equation (8), implying that they do not aﬀect
the model’s predictions over what mergers occur. Should a ﬁrm not enter a merger with another
company, it earns a merger surplus of zero.
Like Farrell and Scotchmer (1988), I make the simplifying assumption that ﬁrms equally split
merger surplus. Under an equal-sharing assumption, the total expected payoﬀ to ﬁrm i from merger
St is:




This assumption rules out the possibility of transfers between ﬁrms, that would endogenize how
acquisition surplus is split. For example, I do not allow for the possibility that a weaker ﬁrm
could entice a stronger ﬁrm to form a merger by oﬀering a large share of the merger surplus.
If I were to allow for endogeneous transfers of merger surplus, multiple equilibria would arise,
implying that there would be a non-unique mapping from the model to the data. For my estimation
algorithm below, this implies that for a given parameter vector, I would have to ﬁnd all equilibria
in the acquisition game, which is computationally prohibitive. Like various other papers that build
structural sorting models, I do not check robustness of my empirical ﬁndings with respect to this
assumption, as such an exercise represents a challenging research frontier.26
Across mergers, only the acquisition surplus varies, and it is therefore what deﬁnes ﬁrms’
preferences over mergers. Thus, I characterize the equilibrium and estimation strategy in terms
of acquisition surplus. Notice that under the equal sharing assumption, ﬁrms’ preferences are
symmetric for a given acquisition, as all merging companies earn the same value from their merger.
26See for example Sorensen (2007), Park (2008), Gordon and Knight (2009) for examples of two- and one-sided
matching papers requiring a ﬁxed sharing assumption. Fox (2009) presents an alternative estimation strategy that
is robust to endogenous transfers. He develops a maximum score estimator for 2-sided, one-to-one or many-to-many
matching models, with binding quotas in the latter case.
21Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is the stability of merger structure Πt. The intuition is that for a given
Πt, no group of buyers and sellers can coordinate to create a blocking merger ˜ St / ∈ Πt that yields
higher surplus to all of the coordinating buyers and sellers relative to what they realize under Πt.
Formally, the deﬁnition is:
Πt is a stable merger structure if and only if ∄ ˜ St / ∈ Πt such that ∀ i ∈ ˜ St, ∆V˜ St > ∆VSt[i],
where St ∈ Πt.
Under the payoﬀ structure from the acquisition game, ﬁrms’ preferences over mergers are strict (i.e.
each ﬁrm can uniquely rank their payoﬀs from coalitions) and symmetric. Under these conditions
on preferences, Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) prove that a stable Πt exists and is unique.27 They
provide an iterative “top-down” algorithm that produces the unique merger structure. Denote St
as the set of all possible mergers at time t. Starting from iteration k = 0, the procedure for ﬁnding
the unique stable Πt is as follows:
1. Initialize Π0
t = {∅} and the remaining merger structure vector S0
t = St.









t = {St|St ∈ Sk
t : St ∩ Sk
max = ∅}
5. Go back to Step 3 if Sk+1
t  = ∅, otherwise stop.
This algorithm is particularly useful for conducting counterfactual experiments below.
5 Empirical Implementation
My objective is to estimate the parameters in Equations (2) and (8). Collecting the parameters
of the model, deﬁne θ1 = {β,Σǫ}, θ2 = {fc2,ac0,ac1,ec0,ec1,σε}, and θ = {θ1,θ2}.28 The model
27Similar results related to existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium have recently have been shown for one and
two-sided matching games by Rodrigues-Neto (2007) and Sorensen (2005). Similar “top-down” algorithms for ﬁnding
the unique equilibrium are also provided in these papers.
28Notice that I do not estimate fc0,fc1 and Σω (the covariance matrix of the ﬁxed cost shocks) in Equation (3). The
terms corresponding to fc0 and fc1 diﬀerence out when I compute ∆VSt. They do not aﬀect merger outcomes, and
are therefore are not identiﬁed by the model. I also ignore ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects in ﬁxed costs (fc3i), as incorporating
a vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects drastically increases the computational burden of estimation in the second step.
22is estimated in two steps to reduce computational burden. First, I estimate the parameters of the
variable proﬁt (θ1) using the LSA-level CRTC Master File data, and the matched Census data.
The remaining parameters (θ2) are then estimated using variation in buyout and entry decisions,
the geographic location of buyers and sellers, and predictions for LSA-level variable proﬁts from
the estimated variable proﬁt function.
I estimate Equation (2) as a multi-level mixed eﬀects model that includes LSA ﬁxed eﬀects, and
ﬁrm random eﬀects.29 This introduces another parameter into θ1, σβ4, the variance of the mean-
zero i.i.d normal ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt shocks. The vector of proﬁt shifters in Equation (2) includes
per capita income, per capita income squared, age, age squared, urban density, the unemployment
rate, and the proportion of the population with post-secondary education. I include a quadratic
trend in all speciﬁcations to control for yearly trends in per-subscriber proﬁtability.
The remaining parameters in θ2 are estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood. Given the
data, the ﬁrst-step parameter estimates (ˆ θ1), a given β4 draw (i.e. the vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt
shocks), and a value for θ2, the likelihood that the observed merger structure in period t in the
data corresponds to a stable Πt is
ℓ(Πt stable |θ2,β4) =
 
ε
1{Πt stable |θ2,β4} =
 
εΠt
P(Πt stable |θ2,εΠt,β4) (10)
where ε and εΠt are vectors of εSt shocks for all possible St’s, and for all St ∈ Πt respectively.
The expression 1{ } is an indicator function equalling one if the argument is true. Conditional
on a given εΠt and β4 draw, the probability that Πt is stable can be computed as a product of
probabilities:






















t / ∈ Πt} is the set of all mergers not in Πt, and DS′
t = {St|St ∈ Πt,St ∩ S′
t  = {∅}}
is the set of deviating ﬁrms from Πt needed to form alternative merger S′
t / ∈ Πt. This simple
29I do not include a full array of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects as this leads to an incidental parameter problem. I have
experimented with speciﬁcations that involve multiple ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercepts for larger companies in the sample and
ﬁnd virtually no diﬀerence in the results.
23calculation follows from the assumption that the merger-speciﬁc shocks are i.i.d. across mergers.
Likelihood
To simulate the likelihood function of the model, I must evaluate acquisition surplus for all possible
mergers in the sample.30 The number of mergers increases exponentially in the number of ﬁrms,
which can make computation of Equation (10) infeasible.31 To reduce the dimensionality of the
problem, I ﬁrst break up the country into m = 1...M geographic regions, across which ﬁrms
play acquisition games independently. For national cable operators such as Shaw or Rogers, this
implies that their regional subsidiaries do not consider the impact of their mergers in other regions
when playing the acquisition game. For estimation, I deﬁne 10 geographic regions based on the
Statistics Canada Census economic regions for 2001. Their deﬁnitions can be found in Table 7 in
the Appendix.32 Given these M independent regions, and the assumption that cable companies










dG(β4; ˆ σβ4) (12)
where Πmt denotes the merger structure in region m at period t, G is the CDF for the β4, and ˆ σβ4
is the estimated variance of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt shocks from the ﬁrst step. Since Equation (12)
cannot be computed analytically, so for estimation I use simulation methods to approximate the
log-likelihood:



















where β4m is a vector of region m’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt shocks, B and K are the number of simulation
draws for β4,m and εΠmt, and βb
4m and εk
Πmt are the bth and kth draws. Recall the elements of β4 are
30More speciﬁcally, I simulate acquisition surplus for all observed mergers, and evaluate merger surplus without
any merger-speciﬁc shocks for all unobserved acquisitions.
31In a merger game involving N incumbent ﬁrms, the number of mergers is the sum of the binomial coeﬃcients






. So for example, a merger game involving 25 incumbents has over 1 billion possible
mergers
32I drop the provinces of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island as acquisition activity in these provinces is
minimal over the 1990-1996 period.
24i.i.d draws from a mean-zero normal distribution (whose variance is estimated in the ﬁrst step), and
εΠmt’s elements are i.i.d draws from a Type-1 Extreme Value distribution. For companies located
in multiple regions, I draw a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock in each region.
Reducing Dimensionality
Within each geographic region and year, I further reduce the number of mergers in three ways.
First, I follow Weese (2009) and restrict the maximum merger size to be the largest merger observed
within a region in a given year. Second, I restrict the number of ﬁrms playing the acquisition game
within a year and region to include the observed buyers and sellers in the data, and a random
subset of ﬁrms who are inactive in the acquisition/entry market (i.e. ﬁrms who are not buyers or
sellers in a given region and year in the data). This follows an approach taken by Park (2008),
and reﬂects the fact that I do not have natural contiguity restrictions for acquisitions (i.e. ﬁrms
only consider mergers amongst ﬁrms with neighboring LSAs) as in Weese (2009) and Gordon and
Knight (2009), that helps reduce the number of merger surplus values to check in estimation. Even
if a small cable company does not have contiguous LSAs or does not yield economies of density
with a large ﬁrm through an acquisition, the larger company may have an incentive to acquire small
ones because of a scale eﬀect on variable proﬁts. For given region, year and β4m vector, I take a
20% random sample of inactive ﬁrms for each of the K εΠmt draws. I ﬁnd minimal diﬀerences in
the second-step estimates if I alternatively take 10% or 30% random samples. Finally, I drop those
mergers whose minimum distance between buyers’ and sellers’ LSAs is larger than the maximum
distance between merging ﬁrms LSAs in the data. I also drop acquisitions whose acquiring ﬁrm
has less than the minimum of 2500 national subscribers and the minimum national subscribership
of an acquiring ﬁrm within its region and year in the data.
6 Findings
This section presents my parameter estimates for the variable proﬁt, ﬁxed cost and entry cost
functions. I then use the estimated model to perform counterfactual experiments that isolate the
impact that economies of scale, density, and the 1994 policy change have on merger activity.
256.1 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the variable proﬁt function are listed in Table 3. To highlight the
importance of accounting for LSA ﬁxed eﬀects, I present OLS estimates as well. A comparison of
the two sets of estimates shows that controlling for LSA unobserved heterogeneity is important.
Particularly for the parameters of interest, the OLS estimates yield mixed, statistically insigniﬁcant
estimates for the national subscribership coeﬃcient for the pre and post 1994 period. There are
odd ﬁndings for the demand shifters as well. For example, the estimates imply that age and income
have a negative impact on per-subscriber proﬁtability, which contradicts previous empirical ﬁndings
on cable demand and household characteristics (see for example Crawford and Shum (2007)).
After controlling for LSA individual eﬀects, I obtain much more plausible results for both the
parameters of interest, and the marginal eﬀects for the demographic variables. National subscriber-
ship has a statistically signiﬁcant, positive impact on per-subscriber proﬁts, and the marginal eﬀect
declines as national subscribership rises. All of the demand shifters have their expected signs, with
age, urban density and education having statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at the 1% level. The
negative impact of urban density relates to the fact that households in rural areas have less alter-
natives to watching television in their leisure time than do households in urban centers. Income,
age, and educational attainment all have a positive impact on proﬁtability, however the estimated
marginal eﬀect of income is not as precisely estimated as the eﬀects of age and education.
Focusing on the parameters of interest, national subscribership has a higher marginal eﬀect
that is diminishing at a more rapid rate in the years following the policy change. Testing the indi-








2 yields P-values of P = 0.187 and
P = 0.127 respectively.33 Although these diﬀerences not are statistically signiﬁcant at standard
levels, their diﬀerence in magnitude has a large impact on ﬁrms’ merger incentives, as shown in
the counterfactual experiments below. Interpreting the coeﬃcients, an increase in national sub-
scribership by a cable operator of 100,000 subscribers raises annual variable proﬁts per-subscriber
by $22.20 and $25.90 for the two periods respectively. In monthly terms, these values are $1.85
and $2.16. This jump in national subscribership for an LSA is not uncommon, given the pattern
33A joint test of the equality of the two parameters also fails to rejects the null (P = 0.301), as does a joint test of
the equality of all coeﬃcients between the 1990-1994 and 1995-1996 periods.
26Table 3: Variable Proﬁt Parameter Estimates
OLS Fixed Eﬀects
dreg=0 dreg=1 dreg=0 dreg=1
Qit -0.051 0.035 0.230∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038)
Q2
it -0.000 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
INC -0.352∗∗∗ -0.070 0.419∗ 0.375∗
(0.133) (0.265) (0.255) (0.212)
INC2 0.022 -0.065 -0.057 -0.014
(0.014) (0.041) (0.039) (0.025)
AGE -0.535∗∗∗ -0.574 0.893∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.348) (0.348) (0.090)
AGE2 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
URB -0.163∗∗∗ -0.105 -2.478∗∗∗ -2.449∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.941) (0.949) (0.095)
UNEMP 1.863∗∗∗ 1.840∗ -0.173 -0.103
(0.334) (1.087) (1.059) (0.945)
EDUC -0.156 -0.587 2.652∗∗∗ 2.640∗∗∗
(0.417) (1.221) (0.797) (0.788)
Constant 18.808∗∗∗ 5.149∗∗∗ - -





Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the LSA level.
***,**,* denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Dependent
variable is the diﬀerence between subscription revenue and channel aﬃliation payments per-
subscriber (viℓt), measured in hundreds of dollars per year. Qit is the sum of all subscribers
across all LSAs for cable company i in year t. The dreg = 0 columns correspond to the param-
eter estimates over the 1990-1994 period, and the dreg = 1 estimates are for 1995-1996. INC
is average employment income of individuals, AGE is average age of the population, URB
urban density measured as one hundred people per square kilometre, UNEMP is the unem-
ployment rate, and EDUC is the proportion of individuals with post-secondary education.
Both speciﬁcations include a linear and quadratic trend term.
of large ﬁrms purchasing small ﬁrms in the data.
An example of a hypothetical acquisition helps shed light on what the per-subscriber proﬁt
function estimates imply for the acquisition game. Consider a potential merger in 1994 involv-
ing two cable companies in the Southwestern British Columbia region, Reliance Distributors and
Shaw Cablesystems. Reliance serves the LSA for Squamish, British Columbia, which has 4,415
27subscribers. Shaw, the dominant cable company in Western Canada, has 1,171,214 subscribers
nationally, many of which reside in nearby LSAs around Vancouver. Ignoring any agglomeration
or ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects on proﬁts, the parameter estimates for the pre-1994 period imply that Shaw
can earn $664,249 additional subscription proﬁts due to the scale eﬀect on proﬁts if it takes over
Reliance’s LSAs. If the exact same acquisition scenario presents itself after the deregulation in
1995, the estimated model predicts that Shaw would generate $747,240 dollars of subscriber-based
surplus. This $82,990 rise in surplus due to the policy change implies that the acquisition is feasible
for a larger region of the support of the merger-speciﬁc shocks in 1995 than it is for 1994.34 This
is the sense in which the deregulation stimulates merger activity in the model.
The second stage estimates for the merger and entry cost functions are found in Table 4.
Evaluating these functions at the mean values of LSA-subscribership and economies of density
between two ﬁrms in the data, I obtain predicted acquisition and entry costs of $631,669, and
$383,943. These values are respectively 28.6% and 17.6% of the mean subscription proﬁt level for
an LSA ($2,180,659). These predictions reﬂect the large sunk costs related to capital upgrades and
new equipment that acquiring/entering ﬁrms spend prior to entering new locations as alluded to in
Section 2 above. Interpreting the coeﬃcients, an additional subscriber amongst a set of acquired
LSAs raises acquisition and entry costs by $32.20 and $22.12 dollars respectively. Economies of
density has a modest eﬀect on acquisition surplus. Consider for example a merger between two
ﬁrms who own one LSA apiece. Suppose the distance between the two LSAs is 75 < ¯ D kilometres.
If the distance between the two LSAs falls by 50 kilometres, then merger cost falls by $2,731.41, or
0.43% of the mean acquisition cost. This indicates that ﬁrms are limited in their ability to spread
their ﬁxed costs of operation locally.
6.2 Economies of Scale, Density, Deregulation and Acquisition Activity
In this section I use simulations to see how well the estimated model predicts acquisition and
entry activity, and to isolate the separate impacts that economies of scale, density and the policy
34That is, the merger yields positive surplus over a larger region of the support in 1995 than in 1994. The change
in the likelihood of the merger is ambiguous as it depends on the relative growth of the other merger opportunities
for Reliance and Shaw.












  ACSt (mean AC) 6.317
  ECSt (mean EC) 3.839
σε 1.886
LL -41447
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. They correspond to outer-product-of-
the-gradient (or OPG) estimates using numerical derivatives of the log-likelihood function.
This assumes the ﬁrst-stage proﬁt function estimates are computed without error. Bootstrap
standard errors, that incorporate sampling variability from the ﬁrst step of the estimation
procedure, will be computed in future versions of the paper. ***,**,* denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The coeﬃcients ac0 and ec0 are in
terms of hundred of thousands of dollars, and mc1 and ec1 are measured in terms of hundreds
of dollars per-subscriber. The economies of density parameter, fc2 is in terms of hundred of
thousands of dollars. The mean values for an LSAs subscribership and economies of density
between two ﬁrms is 8086 subscribers and 0.0784 respectively. The mean subscription level
includes the interpolated data, which the merger and entry cost parameters are estimated on.
All nominal dollar amounts are adjusted to 1992 constant dollars using the seasonally-adjusted
Canadian CPI, excluding indirect taxes, food and energy (Table 176-003, Statistics Canada).
change have on merger behaviour. All results are reported in Table 5, and I provide graphical
representations with Figures 9-11 to help ease comparison across the experiments.
For a given parameter vector θ, I simulate data with the model as follows:
1. Start in year t = 1990. For each region, draw ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable proﬁt random eﬀects β4m
for all initial incumbents using the estimated random eﬀects variance from the ﬁrst step, ˆ σβ4.
2. For each possible merger, draw an εSmt merger-speciﬁc shock. Draw a β4 for all potential
entrants using ˆ σβ4.
3. Compute merger surplus values for all possible mergers using Equation (8).
4. Find the unique stable merger structure by the iterative approach provided by Farrell and
Scotchmer (1988) for each of the M regions.
5. Update the LSA-ownership distribution for each region. Compute the new national sub-
29Table 5: Counterfactual Experiments Predictions
Year Observed Predicted Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Entry Acq. Entry Acq. Entry Acq. Entry Acq. Entry Acq.
1990 32.00 11.00 31.80 19.09 21.71 20.23 27.17 19.23 31.80 19.09
1991 22.00 19.00 23.00 19.86 15.43 19.94 21.23 20.29 23.00 19.86
1992 14.00 17.00 13.91 15.54 8.23 16.43 13.40 16.20 13.91 15.54
1993 12.00 13.00 11.63 12.74 6.63 12.74 10.91 12.51 11.63 12.74
1994 10.00 11.00 12.71 10.94 6.86 11.69 11.80 11.83 12.71 10.94
1995 24.00 11.00 22.57 11.94 9.17 12.71 21.09 12.17 8.06 12.29
1996 15.00 9.00 15.17 6.11 6.34 6.20 14.40 7.26 7.23 6.40
Notes: “Entry” and “Acq.” correspond to average entry and acquisition counts obtained from 500 forward simulations
of the model. The column header deﬁnitions are as follows:
Predicted: Parameter estimates from the 2-step estimation procedure





Experiment 2: No economies of density eﬀects on acquisition costs: fc2 = 0
Experiment 3: No deregulatory eﬀect on the variable proﬁt function: βdreg=1 = βdreg=0
scribership for all remaining ﬁrms.
6. Stop if the year is 1996, otherwise move to year t + 1 and go back to Step 2.
All predictions correspond to mean acquisition and entry levels for 500 simulated sequences. I ﬁrst
forward-simulate sequences of acquisition/entry outcomes using my parameter estimates. The ﬁrst
two pairs of columns in Table 5 and Figure 8 shows that the model predicts acquisition and entry
levels well, including the rise in acquisition levels following the policy change.
The remaining 3 pairs of columns in Table 5 and Figures 9-11 present results for 3 counterfactual









2 = 0. Figure 9 shows a stark decline in acquisition
rates, with no spike in acquisitions in 1995, since the channel through which the deregulation aﬀects
ﬁrms’ relative proﬁts is shut down. Overall, acquisition levels fall by 42%, falling as much as 62%
in 1995. Thus, the scale eﬀect on ﬁrms’ subscription proﬁts plays a major role in ﬁrms’ acquisition
decisions, and is fundamental to the process whereby large cable companies buy out small ones in
the industry over time. Local entry rises in the absence of scale eﬀects, as fewer incumbent mergers
leads to smaller incumbent cable companies, which lowers entry costs.
The second experiment removes the eﬀect economies of density have on ﬁxed costs by setting
fc2 = 0. The results for this counterfactual are listed in the fourth pair of columns in Table 5, and
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are illustrated by Figure 10. The impact on acquisition levels is modest as total acquisitions fall
by 6.98% overall. There is a negligible rise in entry rates due to the slight reduction in incumbent
merger activity. The fall in acquisitions arises from the direct eﬀect of ﬁxed costs not being reduced
by agglomeration, but also an indirect eﬀect as fewer acquisitions early in the sample, reduces the
number of large ﬁrms that could later generate merger surplus through the scale eﬀect on variable
proﬁts. Given the regional clustering of large cable companies observed in the data, this ﬁnding
is somewhat surprising. It suggests that the large regional clusters emerged primarily from larger
companies buying out small ones to capture surplus created by scale eﬀects on variable proﬁts, not
large ﬁxed cost savings due to economies of density.
31The ﬁnal experiment removes the impact that deregulation has on per-susbcriber proﬁtability
in 1994 and 1995 by setting βdreg=1 = βdreg=0. Figure 11 clearly shows that without regulatory
change acquisitions do not jump in 1995. Rather, they continue to monotonically decline, as ﬁrms
deplete the remaining merger surplus in the industry over time. Acquisitions for 1995 and 1996 are
predicted to fall by 66% and 52% respectively in the absence of the deregulatory eﬀect on variable
proﬁt scale eﬀects. Thus, deregulation largely accounts for the spike in acquisitions in the part of
the sample. The predictions for entry levels are relatively unaﬀected, as the pre-1994 growth in
incumbent cable companies is suﬃcient to supress entry in the latter part of the sample.
6.3 Merger and Entry Policy Experiments
Given the fact that the industry is likely to consolidate due to the scale eﬀect on proﬁts, a natural
question to ask is how can policymakers increase the likelihood that the emerging dominant ﬁrms
are relatively more productive. As incumbent ﬁrms grow over time, it becomes increasingly easy
for them to continue acquiring smaller ﬁrms due to the scale eﬀect. However, since new entrants
enter the industry through the acquisition of smaller incumbent ﬁrms, scale-driven acquisitions by
large incumbents can restrict entry activity. This ultimately prevents relatively more productive
entrants from acquiring unproductive incumbents. The CRTC may therefore want to slow acquisi-
tion activity or subsidize entry early in the industry’s life cycle to give productive entrants a chance
to enter the industry before dominant ﬁrms are established.
I perform two sets of policy experiments that investigate the impact that entry subsidies or
policies that increase merger costs (say through merger fees imposed by the CRTC) have on the
long-run distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects as the industry consolidates. The ﬁrst set of experiments
look at entry subsidies that reduce entrant acquisition costs by one-quarter and one-half from 1990
to 1992. The second set of experiments impose merger fees that increase incumbent acquisition
costs by one-quarter and one-half from 1990 to 1992. I forward simulate the data for 20 periods
according to the six-step procedure outlined in Section 6.2 above. These simulations ignore any
future changes in the industry, such as the entry of DBS or the introduction of phone, internet and
cable bundling that arrive in the late 1990’s.
32Table 6: Merger Fees and Entry Subsidies Policy Experiments
Long-Run Firm-Speciﬁc Eﬀect (β4) Distribution
Percentiles
Experiment Mean 2.5 5 25 50 75 95 97.5
Model Predictions 0.234 -0.436 -0.373 -0.122 0.048 0.234 0.537 2.971
25% Entry Costs, 3-year 0.272 -0.442 -0.388 -0.142 0.034 0.245 1.020 4.028
50% Entry Costs, 3-year 0.300 -0.439 -0.382 -0.131 0.044 0.254 0.947 4.528
125% Acquisition Costs, 3-year 0.325 -0.431 -0.374 -0.121 0.050 0.252 0.918 5.198
150% Acquisition Costs, 3-year 0.326 -0.429 -0.370 -0.126 0.052 0.254 0.867 5.313
Notes: Mean and percentiles correspond to distribution of β4 at T = 20, where I assume local covariates for
t > 1996 are as they are in 1996. The time-invariant, ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects are drawn from a normal distribution
with mean zero and variance 0.251, which is estimated in the ﬁrst step of the estimation procedure. All results are
based on 500 forward simulations of the model.
The results from the simulations are presented in Table 6. I present the mean and seven
percentiles from the distribution of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects in the industry for the 20th year of
the forward simulations.35 For comparison, I provide predictions from the estimated model in the
ﬁrst row. Comparing the predictions from the ﬁrst and the remaining four rows, I ﬁnd that initial
entry subsidies and acquisition fees yield higher average productivity. The rise in the mean of the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects ranges from 16% to 39% across the four counterfactual policies. As illustrated
from the percentiles, this rise in average productivity is driven by an increase in the mass in the
right tail of the long-run productivity distribution. As the magnitude of the entry subsidies or
merger fees increases, average productivity rises, and the increase is more pronounced for the rise
in entry subsidies. The results further show that policies that increase merger costs are more
eﬀective in increasing long-run productivity. However, I am hesitant to draw absolute conclusions
over which policy is “better,” since it depends on the chosen entry subsidy level or the factor by
which acquisition costs are increased.
Although these results are speciﬁc to the Canadian cable television industry, they highlight
a broader issue for merger or entry policies in industries where scale eﬀects are present. In the
long-run, dominant ﬁrms are likely to emerge in these industries, making entry by potentially more
productive ﬁrms increasingly more diﬃcult over time. The cable television provides an example of
such an industry, however in other industries, such the rapidly growing social-media industry, there
35Formally, the distribution consists of: {β4imt | i ∈ Nmt,m = 1...M,t = 2010}.
33are also advantages to being large, and dominant ﬁrms are likely to arise in the long-run.36 My
ﬁndings suggest that entry subsidies or slowing initial acquisitions and consolidation in industries
with scale eﬀects can help ensure that a rich pool of entrants is initially established. The productive
ﬁrms are more likely to remain, and they grow through their relative productivity advantage, as
well as through scale eﬀects over time. If unproductive ﬁrms are permitted to grow initially through
acquisitions, they can subsequently grow and suppress potential entry solely through scale eﬀects.
It is this long-run outcome of having large, unproductive ﬁrms that initial entry subsidies or reduced
consolidation rates can help avoid.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a model of acquisitions and entry for an industry that is subject to
exclusive territorial licensing. The model is estimated using unique proﬁt and acquisition data for
the Canadian cable television industry over the 1990-1996 period. I ﬁnd that large cable companies
earn more proﬁts per subscriber than small ones, and that this scale eﬀect is the main driver of
acquisitions in the industry. Controlling for scale eﬀects, economies of density are found to have
a relatively smaller impact on ﬁrms’ merger incentives than expected a priori. I also study the
interaction between deregulatory policy and merger activity. The 1994 deregulation increases the
scale eﬀect on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, which gives large ﬁrms an additional incentive to buyout smaller cable
companies. Through counterfactual simulations, I show that this policy change is largely responsible
for the observed rise in acquisition behavior that follows the deregulation in the data. Finally, I
provide a set of experiments that show how policies that stimulate entry or reduce acquisition levels
in the industry’s infancy can lead more productive dominant ﬁrms in the long-run.
Future research will evaluate the welfare eﬀects of acquisitions in the industry. Using the price
and channel data contained in the CRTC Master ﬁles, I can estimate a structural demand system
for basic and non-basic cable as in Chipty (2001), which in turn can be used to calculate the
welfare gains from the observed acquisitions in the data. As shown in this paper, large ﬁrms have
36In the case of social media, the industry is characterized by network-eﬀects. In such industries there is a relative
advantage to being large since larger networks are more valuable to consumers on those networks.
34an incentive to buyout small ﬁrms in the cable industry, and in doing so they expand the channel
options available to subscribers. Of interest is the extent to which such expansions in channel
options yield welfare gains, and to what extent any welfare gains are oﬀset by increases in the price
of basic or non-basic service following acquisitions.
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Table 7: Region Deﬁnitions
Census
Region Name Economic Regions Total LSAs
Nova Scotia 10-50 75
New Brunswick 10-50 38
Quebec North 20, 50-70 109
Quebec South 25-45 80
Ontario East 10, 15, 90 145
Ontario South 20-80 47
Manitoba and Northern Ontario 95 (Ont.), 10-70 (Man.) 53
Saskatchewan 10-50 133
Alberta and Rockies 10-60 (Alb.), 30-40 (BC) 132
British Columbia 10, 20, 50-70 124
Notes: Economic regions correspond to their 2001 Census deﬁnitions. Economic region numbers
correspond to within-province region deﬁnitions, with the exception of multi-provincial regions where
both the within-province regions are listed, with province in brackets. The .pdf ﬁle that maps these
regions can be found at: http://geodepot.statcan.ca/Diss/Maps/ReferenceMaps/n er e.cfm
38Figure 12: CRTC Decision 89-46
Decision 
Ottawa, 14 February 1989 
Decision CRTC 89-46 
Adelaide Radio & T.V. Limited 
St. Mary's, Ontario - 882794100 
Pursuant to Public Notice CRTC 1988-212 dated 22 December 
1988, the Commission approves the application for authority to 
transfer effective control of Adelaide Radio & T.V. Limited, licensee 
of the broadcasting receiving undertaking serving St. Mary's, 
through the transfer of all of the common voting shares from the 
existing shareholders (the Tipping family) to Rogers Cable T.V. 
Limited (Rogers). 
Rogers has proposed to purchase 100% of the shares of Adelaide 
Radio & T.V. Limited for the purchase price of $600,000. Based on 
information filed with the application, the Commission has no 
concerns with respect to the availability or adequacy of the 
required financing. 
Rogers is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Canadian Cablesystems 
Limited, which in turn, is indirectly and ultimately controlled by Mr. 
Edward Rogers of Toronto. 
Through various companies, Mr. Rogers owns CFTR and CHFI-FM 
Toronto and eight cablesystems in Ontario, one in Alberta and five 
in British Columbia. Mr. Rogers also holds a 25.4% interest in YTV 
Canada Inc., the youth-oriented specialty service; a 74.2% 
interest in the multilingual station CFMT-TV and a majority interest 
in the Canadian Home Shopping Network (CHSN) Ltd., a non- 
programming cable service. 
As stated in a number of decisions relating to applications for 
authority to transfer ownership or effective control of broadcasting 
undertakings, and because the Commission does not solicit 
applications for such transfers, the onus is on the applicant to 
demonstrate to the Commission that the application filed is the 
best possible proposal under the circumstances, taking into 
account the Commission's general concerns with respect to 
transactions of this nature. 
The Commission reaffirms that the first test any applicant must 
meet is that the proposed transfer of ownership or control yields 
significant and unequivocal benefits to the communities served by 
the broadcasting undertaking, to the Canadian broadcasting 
system as a whole, and that it is in the public interest. 
In particular, the Commission must be satisfied that the benefits, 
both those that can be quantified in monetary terms and others 
which may not easily be measurable in terms of their dollar value, 
are commensurate with the size of the transaction and that they 
take into account the responsibilities to be assumed, the 
characteristics and viability of the broadcasting undertakings in 
question, and the scale of the programming, management, 
financial and technical resources available to the purchaser. 
In assessing this application, the Commission has taken into 
consideration Rogers' commitment to provide St. Mary's with a 
level of cable service equivalent to that of the neighbouring Grand 
River system. Also, Rogers intends to extend the company's 
service hours thereby decreasing response time for service calls 
and improving accessibility to the cable company. The Commission 
also notes the extensive experience and resources upon which the 
purchaser may draw in order to maintain and improve service to 
subscribers.
In evaluating the benefits to be derived from this transaction, the 
Commission has taken into account that Rogers has committed to 
spend $568,000 to improve technical services $500,000 of which 
may be recovered through rate applications filed under subsection 
18(6) of the Cable Television Regulations, 1986 (the regulations). 
In this respect, Rogers has committed to spend approximately 
$120,000 for improvements in the St. Mary's signal package by 
including in the channel line-up Canadian specialty services and 
FM services not currently available. Further, in this regard, Rogers 
has undertaken to rebuild the system in order to increase capacity 
on the basic service from 15 to 29 channels. The estimated capital 
cost of this proposal is $380,000. 
Although an application to recover these capital expenditures 
which represent about $500,000 may be filed under subsection 
18(6) of the regulations, the Commission notes Rogers' 
commitment that the basic monthly fee at St. Mary's will be no 
more than the authorized rate for the adjacent Grand River 
system. 
Having examined the financial situation of the current licensee, the 
Commission notes that Adelaide Radio & T.V. Limited has 
experienced declining rates of returns on net fixed assets and, in 
this regard, considers that the licensee appears unable at present 
to finance basic on-going maintenance programs and would have 
difficulty financing the extensive capital improvements that will be 
necessary in the future. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission considers that these 
expenditure commitments will benefit St. Mary subscribers. 
In addition, the purchaser has proposed quantifiable benefits 
totalling $68,000 that will accrue to subscribers through technical 
improvements and other programming and operating 
expenditures. 
Specifically, Rogers will introduce by September 1989 full-service 
community programming that will, among other things, provide 
coverage of St. Mary's town council meetings. Also, Rogers will 
incorporate a descrambling system enabling subscribers greater 
flexibility in the selection of discretionary services. 
The Commission has therefore concluded that the benefits, both 
intangible and quantifiable, are commensurate with the size of the 
transaction, the viability of the undertaking in question, the 
responsibilities involved and the resources available to the 
purchaser. In view of all the foregoing and having examined the 
information available to it, the Commission is satisfied that the 
proposed transfer of control will yield significant benefits to cable 
subscribers in St. Mary's and that approval of the application is in 
the public interest. 
The Commission acknowledges the intervention received from Mr. 
Chris West in support of this application. 
Fernand Bélisle 
Secretary General
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Decision 
Ottawa, 24 July 1995 
Decision CRTC 95-476 
K-Right Communications Limited 
Wellington, Abrams Village and Urbainville, Prince Edward Island - 
942042300 - 942043100- 942044900 
Acquisition of assets 
Deletion of local head end and interconnection to the Summerside 
undertaking 
Change to authorized service area 
Following a Public Hearing in the National Capital Region beginning 
on 15 May 1995, the Commission approves the application for 
authority to acquire the assets of the cable distribution 
undertaking serving the above-noted communities from La 
Coopérative des Communications Communautaire Limitée (La 
Coopérative), and for a broadcasting licence to continue the 
operation of this undertaking. 
The Commission will issue a licence to K-Right Communications 
Limited (K-Right), expiring 31 August 2002, upon surrender of the 
current licence. The operation of this undertaking will be regulated 
pursuant to Parts I and III of the Cable Television Regulations, 
1986 (the regulations). The authority granted herein is subject to 
the same conditions as those in effect under the current licence, as 
well as to any other condition specified in this decision and in the 
licence to be issued.
 
The price of the transaction is $237,923. However, the Commission 
notes that the Purchase and Sale Agreement stipulates: "Should 
the CRTC not issue a license to the Purchaser permitting the 
construction of the System Extension or should the Purchaser not 
construct the System Extension before the earlier of the first 
anniversary of the Closing Date and April 30, 1996, the Purchase 
Price shall be increased by $63,000." 
Based on the evidence filed with the application, the Commission 
has no concerns with respect to the availability or the adequacy of 
the required financing and is satisfied with the benefits flowing 
from this transaction.
 
In view of the approval granted herein, it would appear that no 
further action is required on the application (941086100) 
submitted by La Coopérative for the renewal of its licence which 
was announced in Public Notice CRTC 1995-10 dated 20 January 
1995. 
Nevertheless, in Decision CRTC 95-477 dated 1995, the 
Commission renewed La Coopérative's licence until 31 December 
1995, in order to allow sufficient time for completion of the 
acquisition of assets approved herein. 
Interconnection 
The Commission also approves the application for authority to 
delete the local head end at Wellington and to interconnect that 
undertaking, via optical fibre, to the undertaking serving 
Summerside. The Commission notes that the Summerside 
undertaking is a Class 2 system and that the Wellington system is 
regulated pursuant to Parts I and III of the regulations. The 
Commission also notes that the number of programming 
services provided to the Wellington undertaking as part of the 
basic service would increase from 12 to 23. 
The Commission also notes that the applicant will cease 
distribution of CBMT Montréal. The Commission also notes that the 
distribution of CHCH-TV Hamilton and CITV-TV Edmonton which 
are now available to Wellington subscribers as part of the basic 
service, will only be available on a discretionary basis
. 
In addition to the services required or authorized to be distributed 
pursuant to the applicable sections of the regulations, the licensee 
is authorized to continue to distribute, at its option, CFJP-TV 
Montréal, received via satellite, as part of the basic service. 
The applicant is also authorized, by condition of licence, to 
continue to distribute the programming service of the Atlantic 
Satellite Network (ASN), received via satellite, provided that it is 
distributed on an unrestricted channel of the basic service. 
Change to authorized service area 
The Commission also approves the application to change the 
licensed area for the Wellington undertaking by including the 
communities of St. Chrysostome, Cape Egmont and St. Timothy. 
The Commission notes that the subscribers in the extended area 
will be offered the same programming services and will be charged 
fees identical to those in the current licensed service area.
This approval is subject to the requirement that construction in the 
extended area be completed and the extended system be in 
operation within twelve months of the date of this decision or, 
where the applicant applies to the Commission within this period 
and satisfies the Commission that it cannot complete the 
construction and commence operations throughout the extended 
system before the expiry of this period and that an extension of 
time is in the public interest, within such further periods of time as 
are approved in writing by the Commission.
 
Should construction not be completed within the twelve-month 
period stipulated in this decision or, should the Commission refuse 
to approve an extension of time requested by the applicant, the 
authority granted to change the service area shall lapse and 
become null and void upon expiry of the period of time granted 
herein or upon the termination of the last approved extension of 
time period. 
In Public Notice CRTC 1992-59 the Commission announced 
implementation of its employment equity policy. It advised 
licensees that, at the time of licence renewal or upon considering 
applications for authority to transfer ownership or control, it would 
review with applicants their practices and plans to ensure 
equitable employment. In keeping with the Commission's policy, it 
encourages the applicant to consider employment equity issues in 
its hiring practices and in all other aspects of its management of 
human resources. 
The Commission acknowledges the intervention submitted by the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, expressing its wish that the 
applicant consider the distribution of the Réseau de l'information 
(RDI). A similar intervention was submitted by the Société Saint-
Thomas-d'Aquin. 
In reply, the applicant stated that this fall it will address the 
carriage of RDI as well as other services to be added 1 January 
1996. While the Commission notes that RDI is not a priority 
programming service, it reiterates the importance of Canadian 
programming services being given the widest possible distribution. 
The Commission encourages the applicant to take 
intoconsideration the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA) 
Access Commitment with respect to the carriage of licensed 
Canadian specialty, pay television and pay-per-view services 
in minority official language markets. 
Allan J. Darling
Secretary General 40